“Unresolved ambiguity.” David Kay used that phrase in testimony yesterday to describe what is and what’s not known about Saddam Hussein’s weapons program. Unresolved ambiguity might also be a good way to sum up how an increasing number of people in the U.S. and the U.K. feel about the use for and the war in Iraq.
While the Senate Armed Services Committee heard the former chief weapons inspector’s call for an independent inquiry into prewar intelligence, questions about British intelligence burst to the surface on the other side of the Atlantic. Lord Hutton concluded that Tony Blair didn’t lie about the threat posed by Iraq, he was just quoting bad intelligence. That leaves the war watching public in both countries at a loss for what to believe, and who to blame.
Daniel Byman, assistant professor at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution
Matthew Symonds, political editor of The Economist
Dana Milbank, staff writer for The Washington Post
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, and former IAEA weapons inspector